Gilles Deleuze

What Is the Creative Act?

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Video (French with English subtitles): Watch on YouTube

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I, Dr Zeliha Kuruducu, used this lecture while preparing for the ASTR 2026 Anti-Authoritarian Theatre Working Group. My preparatory work included listening to the YouTube recording, making a personal audio recording, transcribing passages and taking notes. This reading copy is compiled for students and researchers in theatre and performance. The English text supplied for this edition explicitly credits Charles J. Stivale for its revised transcription and translation; that credit is preserved. My preparatory work does not imply authorship of his translation.

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ChatGPT assisted with layout, correction of evident English typographical and grammatical slips, and preparation of the separate Turkish working translation. The lecture has not been abridged. Oral repetitions, pauses and source editorial brackets are retained where present; line and page breaks have been reset. This edition has not been checked word for word against the French recording. The Turkish version is translated from the supplied English text and is not an authorised translation. It should be checked against the French source for scholarly quotation.

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Source translator’s note

[This translation is based on the transcript published in Two Regimes of Madness (Paris: Minuit, 2003; Cambridge, MA: MIT/Semiotext(e) 2006), edited by David Lapoujade, translated by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina. However, their “official” text differs significantly from the video recording to the lecture, and the transcript presented here (and hence the translation) include several revisions: correction of some transcript errors present in the WebDeleuze and the Minuit versions as well as of omissions; inclusion of small but repeated oral aspects of Deleuze’s presentation, eliminated for purposes of the Minuit publication; indication (within brackets) of subsequent additions to the transcript (and translation) within the “official” text but absent from the oral presentation; and finally, in italics, a brief moment in the transcript cut from the video version.]

Lecture text

I would also like to ask a few questions of my own, ask you a few and ask myself a few. They would be of the type: What do you do exactly, those of you who do cinema? And what do I do when I do or hope to do philosophy? And as a function of this, do we have something to say to each other?

So of course, things aren't going too well for you, but they're really going poorly where I work, [Laughter] but that's not the only thing we have to discuss. Or rather, I could ask the question a different way: what does it mean to have an idea in cinema? If someone does or wants to do cinema, what does it mean to have an idea? What happens when you say: "Hey, I have an idea?"

Because, on the one hand, everyone knows that having an idea is a rare event; it is so rare that it is a kind of celebration, not very common. And then, on the other hand, having an idea is not something general. No one has an idea in general. An idea, like the one who has the idea, is already dedicated to a particular field. I mean that an idea is sometimes an idea in painting, sometimes an idea in a novel, sometimes an idea in philosophy, sometimes an idea in science. And obviously the same person won't have all of those ideas.

If you will, ideas have to be treated like kinds of potentials; ideas are potentials already engaged in one mode of expression or another and inseparable from the mode of expression, such that I cannot say that I have an idea in general. Depending on the techniques I am familiar with, I can have an idea in a certain domain, an idea in cinema or an idea in philosophy. What does it mean to have an idea about something?

So I'll again refer to the fact that I do philosophy and you do cinema. So, it would be too easy to say that, yes, since everyone knows that philosophy is ready to reflect about anything, why couldn't it reflect about cinema? And this is an inadequate question. Philosophy is not prepared to reflect on just anything; it's not prepared to reflect on something else. I mean, by treating philosophy as the power to "reflect about" seems to be granting it a great deal, and in fact, everything is being taken from it.

No one needs philosophy to think. I mean, the only people capable of thinking effectively about cinema are the filmmakers and film critics or those who love cinema. Those people don't need philosophy to think about film. The idea that mathematicians might need philosophy to think about mathematics is comical. If philosophy had to be used to think about something, it would have no reason to exist. If philosophy exists, it is because it has its own content.

If we are asking ourselves what the content of philosophy is, this is very simple: philosophy is a discipline that is just as inventive, just as creative as any other discipline, and it consists in creating or inventing concepts. Concepts do not exist ready-made in a kind of heaven waiting for some philosopher to come grab them. Concepts have to be produced. Of course, you can't just make them like that. You don't just say one day, "Hey, I am going to invent this concept," no more than a painter says "Hey, I'm going to make a painting like this". There has to be a necessity, in philosophy and elsewhere, just as a filmmaker doesn't just say, "Hey, I'm going to make this film!" There has to be a necessity, otherwise there is nothing at all. [A creator is not a preacher working for the fun of it. A creator only does what he or she absolutely needs to do.] It remains to be said that this necessity -- which is a very complex thing, if it exists -- means that a philosopher -- and here at least I know what a philosopher deals with – isn't even involved in reflecting about cinema. A philosopher proposes to invent, to create concepts.

I am saying that I do philosophy, that is, I try to invent concepts. I don't try to reflect about something else. If I ask, those of you who do cinema, "what do you do?", I am choosing a rather childish definition, so grant this to me; there certainly are other ones, better ones. I would just say that what you invent are not concepts; that is not your concern. What you invent are what might be called blocks of movement-duration. If someone produces a block of movement- duration, perhaps this means one might be doing cinema. Notice that this has nothing to do with invoking a story or rejecting it. Everything has a story. Philosophy also tells stories; it tells stories with concepts. Cinema, I believe and we can assume, tells stories with blocks of movement-duration. I can say that painting invents an entirely different type of block; they are not blocks of concepts or blocks of movement-duration, but let's assume that these are blocks of lines-colors. Music invents another type of block that are just as specific. But I am saying in all this that science is no less creative. I do not see much opposition between the sciences and the arts.

If I ask a scientist, "what do you do?", he or she also invents. They do not discover – a scientist, or at least, the discovery exists, but while that's part of it, that's not how we describe scientific activity as such. A scientist who has invented creates as much as an artist. [Here, comparing the conference text available in Deux régimes de fous with the video on YouTube, one notices an evident cut in which a very brief video segment is removed, in the two following paragraphs.]

-- So, to go also, to remain within definitions as concise as those with which I started, you know, a scientist, nonetheless, is someone – a scientist, this isn't complicated – is someone who invents or creates functions, and only by the scientist. He or she does not create concepts; in so far as being a scientist, he or she has nothing to do with concepts. That's even why, fortunately, philosophy exists. On the other hand, there is something a scientist is alone in knowing to do: inventing and creating functions. So, what is a function? We could define that as simply as I've tried to do since we are really staying within what's the most rudimentary, not at all because you wouldn't understand more, but because I'm the one who would be already overwhelmed in this.

And then there's no point, for what I want to say to you today, there's no point in going farther. I will go for the simplest: what is a function? A function exists as soon as at least two aggregates are placed into a regulated correspondence. The basic notion of science – and not just recently, but for a very, very long time – the basic notion of science is the notion of aggregates, and an aggregate is completely different from a concept. It has nothing to do with a concept. And as soon as you place aggregates into regulated correlation, you obtain functions, and you can say: "I'm doing science". --

And if anyone can speak to anybody else, if a filmmaker can speak to a scientist, a scientist can have something to say to a philosopher, and vice versa, this is only in terms of and according to the creative activity of each one of them. Not that there's an occasion for discussing creation -- creation is something of a very solitary and… -- not that there's an occasion for discussing creation, but I do have something to say to someone else in the name of my creation. And so, if I lined up all the disciplines that define themselves through creative activity, if I lined them up, I would say that they have a common limit. The limit common to all of these series, all of these series of inventions -- inventions of functions, inventions of blocks of duration-movement, inventions of concepts, etc. – the series or the limit common to all these is what? It is space-time. As a result, if all of these disciplines communicate, if all of these disciplines communicate together, it is at the level of something that never emerges for its own sake but is engaged in every creative discipline: the formation of space-times.

In Bresson's films, as we all know, there are seldom complete spaces. They are spaces we could call disconnected. For example, there is a corner, the corner of a cell, and then we see

another corner or part of the wall, etc. Everything takes place as if Bressonian space in some ways was made up of a series of little pieces with no predetermined connection, a series of little pieces for which the connection isn't henceforth predetermined. There are some great filmmakers who, on the contrary, use aggregate spaces. I am not saying it is easier to manage aggregate spaces. [But Bresson's space is a distinct type of space.] There are so many kinds of space in cinema, but I am assuming that this is a type of space that has certainly been reused in a very creative way by others who renewed it in relation to Bresson. I am assuming that Bresson was one of the first to make space with little disconnected pieces, that is, little pieces with no predetermined connection. And I would add: when I was saying in any case, at the limit of all of these attempts at creation, we find space-times, yes, that's all there is. This is where Bresson's blocks of duration-movement will tend towards this type of space, among others.

The answer is a given: these little pieces of visual space, whose connection is not predetermined, how do you expect them to be connected, other than by the hand? [Here Deleuze raises and shows the palm of his hand] And this is not theory or philosophy. It cannot be deduced like that. But I am saying that Bresson's type of space and the cinematographic value given to the hand in the image are connected. I mean that the links between the little bits of Bressonian space -- due to the very fact that they are bits, disconnected pieces of space -- can only take place manually. This explains the exhaustion of the hand in his films. Fine, we could continue at length here, because in this way, Bresson's block of expanse-movement thus gains the hand as the particular characteristic of this creator, the characteristic of this space which is quite special. The hand's role that comes directly from them, only the hand can effectively make connections between one part of space and another. Bresson is certainly the greatest filmmaker to have reintroduced tactile values into film. Not only because he was able to take excellent shots of hands. But, if he was able to take such excellent images of hands, that's because he needs hands. A creator is not someone who works for pleasure. A creator only does what he or she absolutely needs to do.

Once again, having an idea in cinema is not the same thing as having an idea somewhere else. There are, however, ideas in cinema that could also work in other disciplines; there are ideas in cinema that could be wonderful in a novel. But they would not have the same appearance at all. And then, ideas in cinema can only be cinematographic. No matter. Even if there are ideas in cinema that could work in a novel, the ideas are already linked into a cinematographic process that makes them destined in advance for cinema. And what I am saying matters greatly because this is a way of asking a question that interests me: what makes a filmmaker truly want to adapt a novel, for example? If he or she wishes to adapt a novel, it seems obvious to me that it's because he or she has ideas in cinema that resonate with what the novel presents as ideas within the novel, and that, in this way, powerful encounters sometimes, even often, can occur. This is quite different; I am not posing the problem of the filmmaker adapting an eminently mediocre novel. He or she might need the so-so novel, and it does not mean the film will not be brilliant. So I am asking a different question; it would be interesting to look at that problem, but my question is different: what happens when the novel is an excellent novel and when an affinity is revealed through which someone has an idea in cinema that corresponds to the idea in the novel?

One of the most beautiful examples is Kurosawa. Why is he so familiar with Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky? Why does it take a man from Japan to be so familiar with Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky? I must tell you, it's because, it seems to me… [I will again present] an answer among a thousand others, one that concerns somewhat philosophy, I believe. In Dostoyevsky's characters – this might be a tiny detail – within his characters, something rather curious often happens to Dostoyevsky's characters: they are in general very troubled, right? A character leaves, goes down into the street and says, "Tanya, the woman I love, has

called for my help. I must hurry; she will die if I do not go to her." He goes downstairs and meets a friend or sees a dying dog in the street and he forgets, he completely forgets that Tanya is waiting for him. He forgets. He starts talking, meets another acquaintance, goes to have tea at his home and suddenly says again, "Tanya is waiting for me. I must go." [Laughter] What does that mean? Dostoyevsky's characters are constantly caught up in emergencies, and while they are caught up in these life-and-death emergencies, they know that [Pause] there is a more urgent question, but they do not know what it is. That is what stops them. [Pause] Everything happens as if in the worst emergencies – there's the light, "Can't wait, I've got to go" – I told myself [they said to themselves]: "No, there is something more urgent, something more urgent, and I am not budging until I know what it is." It's the Idiot, it's the Idiot; it's the Idiot's formula: "You know, no, no, there is a deeper problem. What problem? I am not sure what it is but leave me alone. Let everything rot, if… no, this more urgent problem must be found." [Pause]

Kurosawa did not learn that from Dostoyevsky. All of Kurosawa's characters are like that. I'd say that there we have an encounter, a felicitous encounter. If Kurosawa can adapt Dostoyevsky, at least it's because he can say: "I share a concern with him, a shared problem, this problem." Kurosawa's characters are exactly in the same situation; they are caught in impossible situations, yes indeed, but hold on! There is a more urgent problem. And I have to know [they have to know] what that problem is. "Ikiru" ["To Live"] may be the film that goes the farthest in this direction. But all of his films go in this direction. "The Seven Samurai", [for example]: this affects me greatly because Kurosawa's entire space depends on it, a kind of necessarily oval space that is drenched in rain. Finally, it matters little; this would take too much time, and there as well, we'd come upon… the limit of everything that is also a space-time. But, in "The Seven Samurai", you understand, the characters are caught up in an urgent situation -- they have accepted to defend the village -- and from the beginning of the film to the end, a more profound question gnaws away at them. Through all of this, there is a deeper question, and it will be formulated at the end of the film by the leader of the samurai as they leave: "What is a samurai? What is a samurai?", not a general rank, but what is a samurai in that era? Namely, someone who no longer serves a purpose. The rulers no longer need them and the peasants will soon learn to defend themselves. Throughout the film, despite the urgency of the situation, the samurai are haunted by this question, one worthy of the Idiot, which is the Idiot's question: we samurai, what are we?

And here, I would say that an idea in cinema is of this type. You will tell me, "no", since this was also an idea in a novel. But an idea in cinema is of this type once it is engaged already within a cinematographic process. And there you can say, "I have an idea" even if you borrow it from Dostoyevsky.

Otherwise, in like manner, I'll quote very quickly, I believe that an idea is very simple. Once again, it is not a concept; it is not philosophy. A concept is something else, [Even if] one may be able to draw a concept from every idea. But I am thinking of Minnelli, Minnelli who, it seems to me, had an extraordinary idea about dreams. It is a simple idea – we can state it -- and it is linked into a cinematographic process in Minnelli's work. Minnelli's great idea about dreams, it seems to me, is that they most of all concern those who are not dreaming. The dream of those who are dreaming concerns those who are not dreaming. Why does it concern them? Because as soon as someone else dreams, there is danger. Namely, people's dreams are always all-consuming and threaten to engulf us, and what other people dream is very dangerous, and the dream is a terrifying will to power, and each of us is more or less a victim of other people's dreams. Even the most graceful young woman even when it's a graceful young woman, she's a horrific ravager, not through her soul, but through her dreams. Beware of the dreams of others, because if you are caught in their dream, you are done for. So you understand, when one has an idea like that, the idea really is not about knowing

whether it is true or false. The question is about knowing if it’s important, interesting, and if it is beautiful, and this is the same in science. You know, it’s the same thing in philosophy.

Or else, another example, I will talk about a properly cinematographic idea, the famous dissociation of seeing and speaking in relatively recent films, be it -- taking the most well-known -- Syberberg, the Straubs, or Marguerite Duras. What do they have in common? Look, and how is this a particularly cinematographic idea – here we have a cinematographic idea -- to create a disconnection of sight from sound? This… Why couldn't it be done in the theater, why? It could be done, but this will be an applic… so, if it occurred in the theater, barring any exception, unless a theater found the means to do it, one could say the theater inserted it from film. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is such a cinematographic idea to disconnect sight from sound and from speaking, the visual from speaking, that it’s… that would respond to the idea [the question of knowing]: what, for example, is it to have a cinematographic idea [in cinema]?

And everyone knows what that consists of; I am saying in my own way so that… A voice speaks about something. So at the same time, someone is talking about something. At the same time, we are shown something else. And finally, what they are talking about is under what we are shown. This third point is very important. You can indeed feel how theater cannot follow here. Theater could take on the first two propositions: someone is telling us something, and we are shown something else. But having what someone is telling us be at the same time under what we are shown -- which is necessary, otherwise the first two propositions would make no sense and be of little interest – if you prefer, we could say, in terms more… [put it another way]: speech rises in the air, speech rises into the air at the same time that the ground we see plunges further down. Or rather, at the same time as what this speech rising into the air talked to us about, what it was talking about plunges into the earth.

What is it if only cinema can do that? I am not saying it has to do it, right? Just that it has done it two or three times. I can simply say that great filmmakers had this idea. It is not a matter of saying that this is what must or must not be created, right? One has to have ideas, whatever they may be. This is what a cinematographic idea is. I am saying that it is exceptional because it ensures a veritable transformation of elements at the level of cinema, a cycle of great elements that suddenly makes cinema resonate with, I don’t know, the qualitative physics of elements. It produces a kind of transformation, [a vast circulation of elements in cinema starting with] air, earth, water and fire, because it must be added, I have… -- obviously we don’t have the time – we would discover the role of two other elements, a great circulation of elements in cinema, a great circulation of elements in cinema.

Moreover, in everything I am saying, that does not eliminate its history, right? The history of cinema is still there, but what interests us is why is this history so interesting? Without it, why does it have all of this behind it and with it? It’s entirely this cycle as I have just quickly defined it -- the voice rising while what the voice is talking about is buried under the earth – that you may have recognized most of the Straubs’ films, the great cycle of the elements in their work. But this circuit is very important which results in there being a kind of beauty in which, in fact, there perpetually occurs a disjunction of what one sees since what we see is solely the deserted earth, but this deserted earth seems heavy with what lies underneath it. You might ask: how do we know what lies underneath it? That is precisely what the voice is telling us. And it’s as if the earth were buckling from what the voice is telling us; it is that which comes to take its place underground at its time and its place. If the earth and if the voice speak to us of corpses, this is the entire lineage of corpses which comes to take its place underground such that, at that moment, the slightest whisper of wind on the deserted

land, on the empty space that you have before your eyes, on the deserted land, etc., takes on its entire meaning, the smallest hollow in this earth, etc.

But as you indeed see, I consider that having an idea, in any case, is not on the order of communication. This is the point I was aiming for because that belongs to the question that was very kindly asked of me. I want to state the extent to which everything we are talking about is irreducible to any communication. This is not a problem. What does it mean? It seems to me that this means, in a first sense, that communication is the transmission and propagation of information. And what is information? It is not very complicated; everyone knows what it is. Information is a set of imperatives, order-words. When you are informed, you are told what you are supposed to believe. In other words, informing means causing an order-word to circulate. Police declarations are appropriately called communiqués. Information is communicated to us, that is, they tell us what we are supposed to be ready to believe, or be required to, or be held to believe. And not even believe but pretend like we believe since we are not asked to believe but to behave as if we did. That’s what information is, communication, and outside these order-words and their transmission, there is no communication, no information. This is the same thing as saying that information is exactly the system of control. And it’s true, I’m stating platitudes, this is obvious. It’s obvious, except that it particularly concerns us all today.

That concerns us today because, and it is true that we are entering a society that could be called a control society. You know, a thinker like Michel Foucault analyzed two types of societies relatively close to ours. He called one type a sovereign society and the other a disciplinary society. And what he called disciplinary societies, that he clearly dated – since there are all the transitions you might like – from Napoleon, which is perhaps a typical passage from a sovereign society to a disciplinary society, the disciplinary society was defined -- Foucault's analyses have remained famous, and rightly so – it was defined by the establishment of milieus of confinement: prisons, schools, workshops, hospitals. And disciplinary societies needed them. His analysis gave rise to ambiguities for some readers because they thought it was Foucault’s final word. Obviously not. Foucault never believed it and even clearly said that disciplinary societies were not eternal. Furthermore, he clearly thought that we were entering a new type of society. There have been, of course, various remnants of disciplinary societies for years, but we already know we are in societies of a different type that are, that should be called, using Burroughs' term -- and Foucault had a very deep admiration for Burroughs – Burroughs proposed the very simple term, control societies. We are entering control societies that are defined very differently than disciplinary societies. We no longer need, or rather, those who are concerned about our welfare no longer need, or will no longer need, milieus of confinement. You will tell me, at the moment this is not at all evident given everything that’s happening now, but that’s not at all the question. It’s a matter for fifty years from now, but currently, prisons, schools and hospitals are already sites of permanent discussion. Wouldn't it be better to expand home visits by doctors? Yes, that is certainly the future. Workshops and factories are bursting at the seams. Wouldn't it be better to use more sub-contracting and working from home? Fine, prisons certainly are a question. What must be done? What can we find? Aren't there other ways to punish people than prison? These are old problems being reborn. Because, as you know, control societies obviously will no longer pass through milieus of confinement.

Even the schools, even schools. We should closely watch the topics that are developing, that will only develop over the next forty or fifty years, to explain how wonderful it would be to pursue both school and a profession simultaneously. Ah, this will be very interesting because what the identity of schools and professions in constant training, which is our future, will necessarily no longer entail gathering children in a milieu of confinement. That can occur in an entirely different way; that could occur via Minitel, anyway, all that, anything you want.

What will be wonderful are forms of control. You see the extent to which a control is not a discipline. For example, I would say about a turnpike, that there you are not confining people, but by making turnpikes, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, [Laughter] but people can travel infinitely without being confined while remaining perfectly controlled. That is our future, control societies being societies of discipline. [Editorial note: This wording is retained from the supplied English source; the surrounding argument distinguishes control societies from disciplinary societies.]

So why am I telling you all this? Well, fine, because let's say that this is what information is, the controlled system of the order-words, order-words circulating within a given society. What does the work of art have to do with that? What does the work of art… You will tell me: go on, all of this means nothing. So let's not talk about works of art; let’s speak, at least we’ll say that there is counter-information. In Hitler's time, the Jews arriving from Germany who were the first to tell us about the concentration camps were performing counter-information. We must realize, it seems to me, that counter-information has never been adequate for accomplishing anything. No counter-information ever bothered Hitler. No, except in one case, but what case? This is what's important. My only answer would be: counter-information only becomes really effective when it is -- and which it is by its nature, so this is not serious – when it is or becomes an act of resistance. And an act of resistance is not information or counter-information. Counter- information is only effective when it becomes an act of resistance.

What relationship is there between the work of art and communication? None; none at all. A work of art is not an instrument of communication. A work of art has nothing to do with communication. A work of art does not contain the least bit of information. In contrast, in contrast, there is a fundamental affinity between a work of art and an act of resistance. There, yes indeed. It has something to do with information and communication, yes, as an act of resistance. What is this mysterious relationship between a work of art and an act of resistance when the men and women who resist neither have the time nor sometimes the culture necessary to have the slightest connection with art? I do not know. Malraux developed an admirable philosophical concept. He said something very simple about art. He said it was the only thing that resists death. I am saying, let's go back to the thing from earlier, at the beginning, about what does someone who does philosophy do? They invent concepts. I think this is the basis for an admirable philosophical concept. Yes, think about it... what resists death? Yes indeed, undoubtedly, it’s enough to look at a statuette from three thousand years before the Common Era to see that Malraux's response is quite an admirable one. But we could then say, not as well, from the point of view that concerns us, yes, that art is what resists, it’s what resists, and that it is perhaps not the only thing that resists. Whence the close relationship between an act of resistance and a work of art. Every act of resistance is not a work of art, even though, in a certain way, it is. Every work of art is not an act of resistance, and yet, in some ways, it is.

What a mysterious way that is; we’d have to perhaps, I don’t know, we’d have to begin another line of thought, a long reflection in order … What I mean is, you permit me to return to “what does it mean to have an idea in cinema? Or what does it mean to have a cinematographic idea?”, when I was saying to you, for example, consider the case of the Straubs, when they operate the disconnection of voice [and visual image] in conditions such that… Notice the idea, it’s … Other, other great authors have considered it differently; I believe that, for the Straubs, they approach it in the following way: the voice rises, it rises, it rises, it rises, and again it rises, and what it is talking about passes under the naked earth, the deserted ground that the visual image was showing us, a visual image that had no relation with the sound image, or which had no direct relation with the sound image.

What is this speech act rising in the air while its object passes underground? Resistance. Act of resistance. And in all of the Straubs' works, the speech act is an act of resistance. From “Moses [and Aaron]” to the last Kafka ["Amerika-Rapports de classe"] including -- I am not citing them in order – “Not Reconciled” or [“Chronicle of Anna Magdalena] Bach”. Remember, Bach's speech act is what? It’s his music, it’s his music that is an act of resistance, an act of resistance against what? It’s not an abstract act of resistance. It’s an act of resistance against and an active struggle against the separation of the profane and the sacred. This act of resistance in music ends with a cry. Just as there is a cry in “Wozzeck” [by Alban Berg], there is a cry in Bach: "Out! Out! Get out! I don't want to see you!" This is the act of resistance. So when the Straubs place an emphasis on this cry, on Bach's cry, or the cry of the old schizophrenic woman, the old schizophrenic woman, I believe, in “Not Reconciled”, it has to account for … fine. In this sense, the act of resistance, it seems to me, has two sides: it is human, and it is also the act of art. [Pause] Only the act of resistance resists death, either in the form of a work of art or in the form of a human struggle.

And what relationship is there between human struggle and a work of art? The narrowest and for me the most mysterious relationship of all. Exactly what Paul Klee meant when he said: "You know, the people are missing." The people are missing, but at the same time, they are not missing. The people are missing means – it isn’t clear, it will never be clear -- that the fundamental affinity between a work of art and a people that does not yet exist.

So finally, well, it’s very… Well, there we are. I am deeply pleased by your very great kindness in having listened to me, and I thank you very much.

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